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Reply

Reply: Clawback to the Future
Miriam A. Cherry† and Jarrod Wong††
In Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of
Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes (the “Article”), we undertook the task of proposing a doctrine of clawbacks that would not only furnish a framework for analyzing
the term more systematically, but would also describe the ways
the doctrine would relate to established rules of contract law.1
With his response, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In
Response to Professors Cherry & Wong (the “Response”),2 Michael Macchiarola has provided us with an opportunity to articulate these thoughts on the doctrine of clawbacks further, and
for that opportunity and his careful reading of the Article, we
thank him.
In essence, the Response takes issue with the Article in
three respects;3 first, with what it terms the “newer” application of clawbacks to “the recoupment of corporate executive
compensation”4; second, with the purported “latent subjectivity”
of clawbacks generally;5 and third, with the apparent operational difficulties of implementing prospective clawbacks, in† Miriam A. Cherry, Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.D., 1999, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1996,
Dartmouth College.
†† Jarrod Wong, Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law; J.D., 1999, University of California at Berkeley
(Boalt Hall); LL.M., 1996, University of Chicago; B.A. (Law), 1995, Cambridge
University. Copyright © 2010 by Miriam A. Cherry and Jarrod Wong.
1. See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and
Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368 (2009).
2. Michael C. Macchiarola, In the Shadow of the Omnipresent Claw: In
Response to Professors Cherry & Wong, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2010).
3. While the Response has other quibbles with the Article, we believe the
three concerns we identified represent its core, and we accordingly limit this
space-constrained Reply to addressing the same.
4. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 10.
5. Id. at 3.
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cluding those relating to measurement and enforcement.6 As
for the first critique questioning the application of clawbacks to
executive compensation, recent events, including the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act blunts the extent of the criticism. The
Dodd-Frank Act, which establishes mandatory clawback policies in the event of an accounting restatement, ensures that
clawbacks will be a significant part of the executive compensation landscape for the foreseeable future.
As to the second critique, we agree to some extent with the
Response that clawbacks and the concept of unfair enrichment
that we described may increase the overall complexity of contracts. However, the additional complexity that the Response
complains of arises in many instances in which an equitable
remedy exists. In this way, the clawback doctrine operates no
differently from many existing equitable doctrines, including,
for example, its close cousin, the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
Moreover, like these other doctrines, the parameters of the doctrine can and will only be more precisely delineated with time.
Further, many of the Response’s fundamental objections to
clawbacks on account of their “subjectivity” apply only to retroactive clawbacks, and not to prospective clawbacks. It bears
noting, therefore, that the Article draws and, indeed, emphasizes the critical distinction between the two. We not only identify and explain the difficulties associated with the retroactive
imposition of clawbacks, but affirmatively recommend writing
clawback provisions into contracts prospectively.
On the final critique, we believe that many of the potential
operational difficulties the Response would associate with
prospective clawbacks will be minimized because their contractual nature requires parties to agree upon, and thus direct
their attention to the content and operability of, such clawbacks. And again, in the course of time and practice, any such
difficulties will be addressed and ameliorated. We address all
three critiques in more detail below.
I. THE DODD-FRANK ACT: CLAWBACKS AND THE
FUTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
The Response notes that “[i]ncreasingly, politicians, commentators and regulators are embracing some recoupment
method to correct perceived past wrongs” in regard to executive

6. See id. at 12–17.

2010]

CHERRY & WONG RESPONSE

21

compensation,7 and that some of this is attributable to “political
posturing.”8 The Response goes on to question whether certain
executive compensation scenarios should be subject to clawbacks at all.9 In its view, “the current crop of examples [involving clawbacks in the area of executive compensation] derives
from shakier statutory footing and suffers from far less robust
precedent upon which to rely.”10 In other words, the Response
appears to suggest that executive compensation does not raise
the kind of legitimate concerns that should be addressed by
clawbacks.
However, the outcry over bonuses, and subsequent events,
have since shown that the Response holds a minority view. Recently, even Judge Richard Posner has (albeit reluctantly) come
to the view that executive overcompensation is problematic.11
Further, events have moved quickly, and rather than speculation about the actions of future politicians or regulators, we
have recently enacted legislation to look to for guidance on
these matters that affirms the “newer,” if not prescient, views
expressed in the Article. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act,12 passed
in the summer of 2010, writes clawbacks into law, providing
them a firm grip on the law of executive compensation.

7. Id. at 12. We would respectfully submit that the events that transpired were actual wrongs, not a mere perception.
8. Id. at 3.
9. For example, the Response states that “not all will agree with the authors’ assertion that . . . ‘payment of the bonus [to an otherwise blameless AIG
executive] is unfair because bonuses should not be decoupled from a company’s
performance, particularly where taxpayer money is involved.’” Id. at 7 n.21.
The Response notes that there are certain scenarios, for example involving a
compliance officer or in-house attorney, where AIG might become “more valuable as the company’s performance beg[ins] to wane” and it would therefore be
appropriate to decouple that individual’s bonus from a company’s performance.
Id. at 6. This assertion, however, fails to account for or even address the fact
that funding by the taxpayer may nonetheless render this situation unfair.
10. Id. at 10–11.
11. See Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What
if Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1020 (2009) (describing larger pay packages received by American CEOs when compared with
their foreign counterparts). This discrepancy may perhaps be a result of the
comparatively larger role of labor in foreign corporate governance process.
Statistics, circa 2003, put the gap at 500 times that of the average worker at
the company. CEOs and Their Indian Rope Trick, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004,
at 61, available at 2004 WLNR 14012834.
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
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Specifically, section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, as
a requirement for listing on a public exchange, that issuers
must have a specific type of clawback in place:
[I]n the event that the issuer is required to prepare an accounting
restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer with any
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the issuer
will recover from any current or former executive officer of the issuer
who received incentive-based compensation (including stock options
awarded as compensation) during the 3-year period preceding the
date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have
been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement.13

Titled “Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation,”14
the provision is wide-ranging, applying to both current and
former executive officers. Although the executive need not forfeit all of the compensation over the last three years, he or she
must return the incentive pay that was based on faulty accounting.15 This is a major step forward and one that we applaud.
On the other hand, this provision certainly could be
stronger. There is no procedural mechanism in the Dodd-Frank
Act for enforcement, which means that shareholders would
have to bring a derivative suit, an action that is potentially
procedurally difficult for shareholders.16 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could also bring an enforcement action, but given the dearth of actions brought under the (significantly weaker) Sarbanes-Oxley clawbacks, one wonders if the
SEC will be more proactive with this enhanced directive. Nonetheless, the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act reaffirms the position that executive overcompensation is a continuing, current
problem.
Additionally, as the Response notes, many companies have
already established clawback policies for executives on their
own, as part of best practices. As we noted in the Appendix to
the Article, there is a wide variation of clawback provisions.
Some are much more harsh than others; others place a good
deal of discretion in the board to determine whether any recoupment should apply; still others are only triggered by mis13. Id. § 954(b)(2).
14. Id.
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hidden Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act, N.Y.
L.J., July 15, 2010, at 5, available at 7/15/2010 N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 2).
16. See id. (“[P]laintiffs will probably have to rely on the traditional derivative suit.”).
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conduct or criminal action against an executive. Others are
triggered by the requirement of “bad faith,” which again invests
a great deal of discretion in the board of directors to determine.
The SEC’s requirement that an accounting restatement trigger
the clawback provides an objective benchmark. Companies, of
course, are free to impose stricter clawback provisions, but they
cannot fall below the mark set by the clawback required in the
Dodd-Frank Act if they are to be listed.
The future has arrived, and new or not, clawbacks in executive compensation are here to stay.
II. THE FUTURE FORWARD: TIME HEALS ALL WOUNDS
(EVEN THOSE OF SUBJECTIVITY)
In the Article, we proposed that clawbacks be defined as “a
right to, or action for, the restitution of unfair enrichment that
is otherwise justified or permitted under prevailing applicable
law.”17 As we view it, “unfair enrichment” is enrichment that
results in “inequities that cannot easily be resolved by existing
remedies under the law because of countervailing legal rights
independently supporting such inequities.”18 For example,
while “it seems unfair that an executive at AIG could walk
away with a bonus when the company he had a responsibility
to assist is failing[,] . . . under existing law, making an equitable claim under these circumstances is problematic as it must
tackle the executive’s original contractual claim to the bonus.”19
The Response complains that this concept of “‘unfair
enrichment’ . . . introduces unwelcomed subjectivity to decisions of whether and to what extent a person’s monies might be
subject to return at some future date.”20 It is true of course that
the application of clawbacks will require a determination of
whether and to what extent any enrichment is “unfair,” and
further, that this may be a fact-intensive inquiry that may
yield different answers close to the margin. However, “[t]hat
there are differences among the conclusions reached by various
models when different input values are used in those models
does not render a theory or technique unreliable.”21 The clawback is a relatively new phenomenon, or at least, hitherto, it
17. Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 412.
18. Id. at 414.
19. Id. at 413.
20. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 6–7.
21. Aero-Motive Co. v. Becker, No. 1:99-CV-384, 2001 WL 1698998, at *3
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2001).
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“‘has been subject to neither rigorous analytical scrutiny nor
definition and exposition.’”22 Courts are still coming to grips
with clawbacks and will no doubt hone and explicate the theory
in the years to come. Indeed, even its long-established close
cousin, unjust enrichment, is still seen today as an evolving
“flexible broad-based theory”23 with such “unanticipated potential”24 that “many scholars advocate a narrow and more predictable reach for restitution.”25 More to the point, it remains
the case that “the framework of restitution is not agreed upon
by scholars or courts.”26 It is therefore instructive to note that
the Response itself makes the same point with respect to the
concept of fraudulent transfer that will apply a fortiori to that
of unfair enrichment: “While the requirements of fraudulent
conveyance might introduce a certain layer of subjectivity, such
concerns are diminishing over time, as precedent and case law
establish its parameters with increasing detail.”27
Moreover, many of the Response’s fundamental concerns
regarding subjectivity are relevant only to retroactive clawbacks, and greatly diminish when one invokes prospective contractual clawbacks. The latter requires that parties agree upon
the very terms and nature of the clawbacks at the inception of
the contracts—whether, for example, we are talking about
clawback provisions in investment or employment contracts.
This means that insofar as prospective clawbacks are concerned, all parties are literally on the same page regarding
“whether and to what extent [the individual’s] monies might be
subject to return at some future date.”28 Having themselves defined the triggers for clawbacks, the parties will not have to
22. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Cherry & Wong, supra note 1,
at 411).
23. Debra L. Greenfield, Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: Unjust
Enrichment and the Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 15 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 213, 214 (2006).
24. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Restitution in Public Concern Cases,
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 901, 904 (2003).
25. Id. at 903.
26. Id. at 905. Another instance of a doctrine that is well established, but
not entirely predictable, is that of unconscionability. See, e.g., Paul Bennett
Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 187 (2005–2006) (“Determinations about unconscionability are subjective. To date no one has been able to articulate an objective
standard. Statutes that empower the judiciary to make findings of unconscionability almost uniformly fail to define what qualifies. Judges are left to fashion solutions that they, and they alone, believe address their charge.”).
27. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 9.
28. Id. at 7.
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contend with the “troubling” prospect of a lack of “the predictive value of the rule of law.”29 Similarly, to the charge by the
Response that “[m]ost basically, the authors fail to answer why
the contractual risk bargained for by two arms-length parties
should be subject to the later assessment of an interloping arbiter,”30 it again bears observing that in relation to prospective
clawback provisions, there is no interloping arbiter for it is the
parties themselves who will have agreed on when and how the
underlying contractual bargain is modified.
A central pillar of the Article is the critical distinction it
draws between “retroactive clawbacks—those that . . . are imposed after the contractual right to the bonuses has arisen and
the benefits have been conferred—and prospective clawbacks
that are introduced into contracts before the claim of right to
the benefits has arisen.”31 Precisely because “any efforts to cure
the inequity retroactively have to confront the particular legal
rights that make the inequity possible”32 and lead to considerable difficulties of implementation (including potential problems
of subjectivity), we have “argued that prospective clawbacks
will be a far more effective way of addressing the various [issues] that arise in executive compensation and Ponzi
schemes.”33
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CLAWBACKS
The Response also fusses over the technical details of implementing clawbacks.34 One particular concern is what the
Response refers to as “measurement problems” associated with
defining triggers for clawbacks in a meaningful fashion, say, for
recovering executive overcompensation.35 This enterprise will
of course not be full grown at its inception, but the contractual
nature of prospective clawbacks will mean that the parties will
generally negotiate and therefore focus explicitly on the scope
and content of such clawbacks. The conflicting incentives of the
parties provide further cause for optimism that their triggers
will be carefully described. Accordingly, any “measurement
problems” will be significantly reduced over time.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 372 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 415 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 416.
See Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 12–17.
Id. at 15.
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The Response also worries about certain practicalities of
collection. For example, the Response mentions the “practical
difficulties of getting employees to return paychecks that they
have already cashed, spent, and paid taxes on,” and notes that
these are “likely to represent a significant burden to effective
implementation.”36 However, these problems are far from insurmountable, as these are precisely the issues that payroll
processors and forensic accountants deal with on a daily basis.
While any such collection should be monitored for accuracy, for
example, to ensure that the clawback amount takes into account the amount of applicable tax that has been paid, this is
not that difficult of a calculation to perform.
As an illustration, we offer our own (perhaps ironic) example. After winning our school’s Sprankling Award for Faculty
Scholarship based in part on the Article, we were accidentally
given two bonuses—one via check at the award ceremony, and
one via direct deposit through payroll. When the matter came
to our attention, we agreed that one of the transactions would
need to be unwound. Such was the case even though one of us
had in the interim cashed the check in addition to receiving the
bonus through direct deposit, and had bills automatically and
electronically paid from those deposited funds. Although there
was initially some confusion about the amount to be paid back
(i.e., whether it was net or gross after tax), the matter was resolved with a few emails to the payroll department and the
money was returned. While there was perhaps some fifteen to
twenty minutes’ worth of administrative energy expended on
the exercise, it was far from an insurmountable or impracticable task.37
Another concern raised by the Response is that of enforceability.38 The Response questions “whether (and to what
extent) privately negotiated provisions, whether in the investment agreement or executive compensation context, will be
respected by a regulator or a court.”39 But prospective clawbacks, like any other privately negotiated provision, are binding on the parties and there is no reason to think that they will
36. Id.
37. We recognize of course that our situation involves neither a prospective clawback nor unfair enrichment. The point here, however, is that the collection issues raised by the Response (and which are equally applicable to our
situation) are not as insuperable as the Response makes them out to be.
38. Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 16.
39. Id.

2010]

CHERRY & WONG RESPONSE

27

not be similarly enforced as a straightforward matter of contract law. That they may be challenged by resort to “appeals
and legislative influence”40 speaks only to how our legal system
functions as a whole, and does not begin to differentiate a dispute over prospective clawbacks from any other legal dispute.
As things stand, there is a distinct policy in favor of clawbacks
that will encourage if not ensure their enforcement. In the
realm of executive compensation, as discussed above, the DoddFrank Act explicitly requires clawbacks,41 whereas in the area
of Ponzi schemes, the rationale articulated by courts in favor of
applying the netting rule—that is, to narrow the gap between
winning and losing investors—would extend readily to the application of prospective clawbacks.42
The Response additionally suggests, however, that even if
there was no dispute over their scope, clawbacks may not be enforced because, for example, a company may decide to “waive
the repayment requirement of an employee unable to return
the required amount without undue hardship.”43 That an individual company or investor may choose not to enforce a contractual right to monies says nothing about whether there
should be such a right. Instead, it says everything about the
executory nature of contract law enforcement mechanisms. In
short, enforcing prospective clawbacks is, in general, no more
problematic than enforcing a(ny) contractual obligation.
CONCLUSION
“Buzz Lightyear: Who is in charge here? Alien Toys (in tone
of reverence): The Claw . . . The Claw chooses who will go and
who will stay.”
–Toy Story.44
The Response suggests that “employees or investors will
come to fear that their monies are forever doomed to the fate of
the stuffed animal in the arcade game—never free to relax in
the shadow of the omnipresent claw.”45 Yet, in Toy Story, a
movie narrated from the perspective of sentient toys, the alien
toys who lived in the arcade game actually celebrated, rather
than feared, the omnipresent (omnipotent?) claw.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See supra Part I.
Cherry & Wong, supra note 1, at 402–06.
Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 16.
TOY STORY (Walt Disney Pictures/Pixar Animation Studio 1995).
Macchiarola, supra note 2, at 7–8.
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In truth, only those who hide inside and look back from the
shame of having unfairly collected monies need cower in the
shadow of the claw. Others who look forward to a bright future
outside the box, much like the sentient toys in Toy Story, may
well embrace what the claw represents.

